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CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 1027:
BROADSWORD OR BUTTERKNIFE?
The frequent failure of party-called expert witnesses to enlighten the jury led
the California Legislature to develop a system of court-appointed expert wit-
nesses.1 The need for an expert witness is felt most crucially in a criminal trial
involving the sanity of the defendant. And yet in an area as esoteric as that of
the workings of the human mind, the compass of those legally qualified to testify
2
presents a supermarket of such variety that parties doing their own shopping
have little trouble finding "experts" whose polemic testimony can often reduce
the issues to mere speculation in the minds of the jury.3
To avoid this "battle of the experts" by utilizing psychiatrists more likely to
be free from bias4 and to provide an indigent defendant with a qualified psychia-
trist,5 the legislature in 1929 adopted section 1027 of the Penal Code. This section
provides for court-appointed psycluatnsts to examine the defendant upon entry
of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.6 The purpose of tis note is to point
out the substantial problems which section 1027 was designed to remedy, and to
examine the extent to which its policy has failed to influence judicial construction.
The Battle of the Experts
The complexities attending a determination of psychiatric competency leave
the lay jury ill equpped to properly resolve the issue.7 The jury's lack of fainil-
1 CAL. EvmEN E CODE § 730 authorizes the court in its discretion to appoint an
expert whenever one might be needed. CAL. PENg. CoDE § 1027 provides for court ap-
pointment of psychiatrists when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity.
Other statutes authorizing the court to appoint experts are CAL. EvmENcE CoDE §§ 460
(matters subject to judicial notice), 752 (interpreters), and 892 (blood tests in pater-
nity cases).2 "Any reputable practicing physician is legally qualified to speak as an expert on
insanity, even though he may never have had any instruction or experience in mental
disease. As a result, it is usually possible to hunt up some quacks or eccentric 'experts'
whose fantastic theories will permit them to testify as counsel wishes, even though no
reputable psychiatrist would agree with them." Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle
of the Experts: Hospital Examination of Crtminal Defendants Before Tral, 2 LAw &
Cor=Mr,. PROB. 419, 420 (1935).
8See Estate of Dolbeer, 149 Cal. 227, 243, 86 Pac. 695, 702 (1906) (dictum).
4 People v. Strong, 114 Cal. App. 522, 526, 300 Pac. 84, 85 (1931) (dictum);
People v. Wiley, 111 Cal. App. 622, 626, 295 Pac. 1075, 1076 (1931) (dictum);
CAIIworIA. Cnmmz ComN, REo 30 (1929).
5People v. French, 12 Cal. 2d 720, 769, 87 P.2d 1014, 1039 (1939) (dictum);
CALwomAN Cainr Cownv'N, REPoRT 30 (1929).
5 The plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is provided for by CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 1016. The defendant may also join a plea of not guilty. If he makes the dual plea,
CAL. Pn. CODE § 1026 provides for a bifurcated trial: the defendant is tried first on
the not guilty plea, at which trial he-shall be conclusively presumed to be sane, and
then on the issue of sanity.
7 "[I]t is erroneous policy to place twelve men, selected at random, in the position
of independent judges of facts whose nature, legal significance, and psycho-biological
effect they usually cannot comprehend.
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iarity with psychiatric concepts in general is compounded by the narrowness of
the legal definition of msanity in particular. 8 Moreover, the concept of legal in-
sanity might be quite incompatible with the personal experiences of the jurors. If
the jury must determine the sanity issue, it is imperative that they receive the
benefit of sound, unbiased expert testimony.
Although the practice of partisan selection of expert witnesses has not es-
caped plethoric criticism by writers, 9 the inherent evils of the practice are most
obvious in the selection of psychiatric witnesses.10 The range of opinion in the
psychiatric profession is perhaps more diversified than in any other field in which
an expert witness might be needed. Although a substantial weight of medical
authority might agree on a particular issue, a self-serving party can usually find
m a fringe segment of the profession someone who will testify as the party de-
sires, and the jury does not know how many psychiatrists the party has consulted
before coming into court. Since the jury usually has no knowledge of psychiatry,
the lughly theoretical basis of the science makes even a very radical theory diffi-
cult to disprove." The unresolvable conflicting testimony always carries with it
a real danger of compromise by the jury. Thus the juror may determine the
sanity issue on a basis supported by neither expert opinion which was presented
to him, but on his own preconceived ideas of insanity for lack of more reliable
and certain evidence.
The Court-Appointed Expert
As early as the 14th century the common law recognized a power in the
courts to call experts at their own discretion.' 2 California has recognized the
"The assumption that the jurors, because they are jurors, are capable of conceiving
the intricate elements of psycic disorders-is an arbitrary inference and a legalistic
atavism. The continued adherence to this backward theory is neither justified by science
nor vindicated by the present-day confusion, arising from the whole problem of criminal
responsibility in cases where insanity is pleaded." BAsoL, ThE ELmdis or CRiM
330 (1927).
8 Califomia determines insanity at the time an offense was committed by a rule
based on the M'Naughten rule, but which broadly interprets the M'Naughten "knowl-
edge" test: "Insanity means a diseased and deranged condition of mind which
renders a person incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of hIs
act, or to distinguish right from wrong in relation to that act." People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.
2d 795, 801, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 274, 394 P.2d 959, 962 (1964).
9 See, e.g., 2 WmorE, EvmmicE § 563 (3d ed. 1940).
10 It has been suggested that "the practice, peculiar to Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence,
of allowing experts in criminal trials to be called on behalf of the parties, lies at the
root of some of the gravest evils of winch such trials are productive." WhmoFEN, IN-
SANITY AS A DEFENSE iN CRIMndAL LAw 419 (1933).
11 The converse is also true. Even a sound psychiatric opion is difficult to prove.
A psychiatrist cannot produce empirical demonstrative evidence to the jury to support
his opinion. His opinion is the result of hns perception of many manifestations of the
mind, and the intricate relationship of those manifestations, wich sometimes defy ex-
planation to the jury. For the tactics of'a skillful cross-examiner in superficially breaking
down even the soundest psychiatric opinon, see Lind, Cross-Examination of the Alienist,
13 J. Cnim. L., C. & P.S. 228 (1922).
12 Rosenthal, The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 LAw & CoNTMEi.
lnoB. 403, 407 (1935).
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power by several statutes.13 Section 1027 of the Penal Code was designed specifi-
cally for the situation where a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity.
The section provides that the court must14 appoint at least two psychiatrists, and
may appoint three.
It is the duty of the psychiatrists so selected and appointed to examine the de-
fendant and investigate his sanity, and to testify, whenever summoned, m any
proceeding in which the sanity of the defendant is in question.15
California law permits the fact that the appointment was by the court to be re-
vealed to the jury.O Presumably this fact will weigh heavily in the jurors' minds.
They know that neither party paid the witness, and so they should impute no
bias or sense of obligation on his part toward either side.
On its face section 1027 appears to solve several problems of the partisan
selection of experts. First, the psychiatrists are selected before they have ex-
amined the defendant, so that their selection is based on their qualifications
rather than their conclusions in a given case. Second, since the jury knows that
the psychiatrists were not selected or paid by the parties, presumably they will
not infer bias on the part of the psychiatrists, and will give their testimony great
weight. The danger of speculation or compromise by the jury is then pro tanto
reduced.
Furthermore, agreement among the psychiatrists that the defendant is legally
sane may lead hun to abandon an ill-advised or sham plea of insanity before
trial,'7 thus saving the expense and time of the sanity trial. On the other hand,
section 1027 is even more important to a defendant whose insanity plea has
merit. Since the defendant has the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance
of the evidence,' 8 section 1027 provides him with a means of producing reliable
and convincing evidence to the jury.
Construction of Section 1027
Shortly after its adoption, section 1027 was attacked in People v. StrongO
as a violation of the privilege against self-mnrmination. 20 There was no claim
13 Statutes cited note I supra.
14 Although the provision is mandatory, it is not jurisdictional, and failure of the
defendant to request their appointment if none is made, is a waiver. People v. Wiley,
111 Cal. App. 622, 625-26, 295 Pac. 1075, 1076-77 (1931).
15 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1027. This section allows the psychiatrists so appointed to "be
called by either party to the action or by the court subject to all legal objections
as to competency and bias and as to qualifications as an expert."
16 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 722. The comment by the Law Revision Commission
says this provision codifies existing law.
17 See Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle of the Experts: Hospital Examination
of Criminal Defendants Before Trial, 2 LAw & CoN-nTE,'. PRoB. 419, 422 (1935).
2
8 People v. French, 12 Cal. 2d 720, 733-34, 87 P.2d 1014, 1021 (1939); CAL.
EVIDENCE CODE §§ 115, 522.
19 114 Cal. App. 522, 300 Pac. 84 (1931).
20 The defendant claimed also that the statute denied him an impartial tral, due
process, and violated the separation of powers doctrine. Pointing out the large body of
criticism of partisan selection of experts, the court held that without a showing that the
psychiatrist was unqualified or not impartial, the defendant could not be prejudiced.
Id. at 524-30, 300 Pac. at 85-87.
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that any statement made by the defendant during the psyclatric examination
had been used against him at the guilt phase of the trial. The defendant's only
objection was that using the court-appointed psychiatrist's conclusion which was
obtained in a compulsory psychiatnc examination violated his privilege against
self-incrimination when used at the sanity phase of the trial.
In answering this objection, the court could have taken either of two ap-
proaches. First, it could have answered the question in the form which the de-
fendant asked it: Is a compulsory mental examination of a criminal defendant
a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination? Since the privilege extends
only to testimonial compulsion, 21 the issue the court would have to determine
is whether a mental examination is testimonial, within the privilege, or physical
exhibition, 22 not within the privilege. The second approach would be to con-
strue the statute as making submission to the psychiatrist voluntary on the part
of the defendant. If he were not required to submit to the psychiatrist, he cannot
complain that he was compelled to incriminate himself.
The first approach was not mentioned by the court. The court stated broadly
that it did not
see any merit in the contention that under section 1027 a defendant is com-
pelled to be a witness against himself. Nothing in the section compels him to
submit to an examination. If he does so the action is purely voluntary. To assert
his constitutional rights all that is required is for him to stand mute, and possibly,
also, to refuse to permit the examination, when the appointed expert undertakes
to proceed; and whether he does so or not there is no compulsion.2s
Broadly construing section 1027 to make submission to the psychiatrist purely
voluntary permitted the court to affirm the conviction and sustain the validity of
the statute, but at the same time the decision substantially weakened the statute's
effectiveness. If a defendant could find a psychiatrist who would testify that he
was legally insane, should he take a chance on what the court psychiatrists would
diagnose? Unless the defendant knew he had a very strong case he would have
little inducement to submit to the psychiatric examination, especially since if he
did submit, and the court psychiatrists' testimony was unfavorable, it would
probably be extremely influential with the jury.
In People v. French24 the defendant refused to submit to any examination
by the court-appointed psychiatrist. A special proceeding was conducted out of
the presence of the jury, in which the prosecution requested that the defendant
be required to submit to an examination. Defendant and his counsel both re-
fused to permit any examination. Later during the course of the trial the court
permitted the prosecution to enter the record of the special proceedings into
evidence against the defendant.
On appeal the supreme court recognized the constructional problem whether
submission under section 1027 was voluntary or mandatory, and the constitu-
tional problem whether compulsory submssion would violate the privilege against
self-mncrmmation.2 5 But the court expressly refused to consider those problems
21See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252 (1910).
22See text at note 59 infra.
2lPople v. Strong, 114 Cal. App. 522, 530, 300 Pac. 84, 87 (1931). (Emphasis
added.)
2412 Cal. 2d 720, 87 P.2d 1014 (1939).
25 Id. at 769, 87 P.2d at 1039 (by implication).
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since the case could be disposed of on other grounds. 26 Assuming that the de-
fendant was correct in Ins contention that submission to the psychiatric examina-
tion is voluntary, the court held that the defendant's active participation in the
refusal to submit was in any event admissible as relevant to the issue of his mental
condition.27 Had French himself not participated in the refusal, the only inference
that could be drawn, without further evidence, would be that Ins counsel thought
that submission was unwise, which would not be relevant to the mental condition
of the defendant hnmself. Then the court would have been confronted with
questions of more substance: Was the District Court of Appeals in Strong correct
in holding that submission to the examination under section 1027 is voluntary,
and would compulsory submission be constitutional?
In People v. Combes28 the defendant submitted to examination by the court-
appointed psycuatrist. At the guilt phase of the trial he took the stand in Ins
own behalf. To impeach hIs testimony the prosecution called the court-appointed
psychiatrist who testified to prior inconsistent statements made during the psycln-
atne examination. On appeal the defendant contended that the admission of the
psychiatrist's testimony, not on the issue of sanity, but on the issue of guilt by
relating incriminating statements made during the examination, violated hIs
privilege against self-incrimination.29 The supreme court, without comment, quoted
the Strong holding that submission to examination by the court-appointed
psychiatrist is voluntary, 0 and therefore the defendant could claim no compulsory
self-incrimination., The fact that section 1027
provides that it is the affirmative duty of an alienist to testify whenever summoned
in a sanity proceeding does not mean or even imply that he is prohibited from
testifymg in other proceedings where information that he may have is relevant
and material.32
As long as the supreme court committed itself to the proposition that sub-
mission to examination by the psychiatrist is voluntary, and therefore no state-
ment made during the examination is privileged, it would seem to follow that
admissions made to the psychiatrist could be used only as prior inconsistent state-
ments, but also as part of the prosecutions case in chief under an exception
to the hearsay rule. 3 One year after Combes the supreme court, relying on that
case, upheld a first degree murder conviction which was based partly on ad-
missions to the psychiatrist during an examination.84
26 Id. at 769, 87 P.2d at 1039.
27 "It cannot be questioned that anything done or said in the proceedings if relevant
to his mental state would be admissible. The proceedings disclose that he was conscious
that his mental responsibility was under investigation and that he was acting in concert
with his counsel who were directing his defense and therefore constituted evidence as to
his mental condition:' Id. at 769-70, 87 P.2d at 1039.
28 56 Cal. 2d 135, 14 Cal. Rptr. 4, 363 P.2d 4 (1961).
29 Id. at 149, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 12, 363 P.2d at 12.
so Id. at 149-50, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 12, 363 P.2d at 12.
31 Ibzd.
32 Id. at 149, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 12, 363 P.2d at 12.
33 The California hearsay rule is codified in CAL. EVIDENCE Co § 1200. CAL.
EvmF.NcE CoDE § 1220 makes out-of-court statements of a party admissible against hIM
as an exception to the hearsay rule.
84 People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415,20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714, cert. denied, 371
U.S. 852, petition for cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 937 (1962).
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The supreme court's solemnizing of the Strong holding that submission to the
psychiatric examination is voluntary put the efficacy of section 1027 in serious
jeopardy. If the defendant were to submit to the examination, it might often
mean sacrificing either his not guilty or Is insanity plea. Since the psycluatriss
principal concern is the mental condition of the defendant at the time the
offense was committed, he will certainly question the defendant about the crime
itself. If the defendant talks freely about the crime, be risks having all his state-
ments used against him at the guilt phase of the trial; if he refuses to talk about
the crime, his active refusal could be used as evidence against him at the sanity
phase of the trial under the rule of French,85 and the court loses the benefit of the
best possible psycluatric analysis.
Not only would the defendant have every reason not to submit, but if his
attorney were to hire a psyclatnst to testify for him, statements made during
the examination would have been privileged under the attorney-client privilege.86
The defendant's attorney could then refuse, without active participation by the
defendant in the refusal, to permit any examination by a court-appointed psychi-
atrist, and both pleas would be protected since no inference of the state of mind
of the defendant could be drawn.
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Massiah -v. United
StateS31 compelled a re-examination of the previous construction of section 1027
In In re Spencer,38 on a writ of habeas corpus, Spencer, who had been con-
victed partly on the basis of admissions made to the court-appointed psychiatnst,3 9
claimed that he had been denied hIs constitutional right to counsel, since in-
criminating statements were elicited out of the presence of his attorney and he
had not waived that right. The Califorma Supreme Court agreed that "if de-
fendant's statements to the psyclatrist may be introduced at the guilt trial, de-
fendant's need of counsel is as acute during the psychiatric interview as during
police interrogation."40 But the court realized that such "presence and participa-
35 People v. French, 12 Cal. 2d 720, 87 P.2d 1014 (1939).
36 Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 60-61, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 881-82, 372
P.2d 919, 921-22 (1962); In re Ochse, 38 Cal. 2d 230, 231-32, 238 P.2d 561-62 (1952).
See also CAL. EVIDENCE CODE §§ 952, 954.
California does not recognize a physician-patient privilege in crnimnal cases. CAL.
EvmENcE CODE §§ 994, 998. But of. CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1014. This section creates
a new psychotherapist-patient privilege which is broader than the physician-patient
privilege. However, whenever the mental condition of a criminal defendant is in issue,
the privilege is quite limited in its scope by CAL. EvWENCE CODE §§ 1016 and 1023.
Moreover, the privilege does not include examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist
unless the appointment is at the request of a crinmal defendant's attorney in order to
prepare a defense. CAL. EVIDENcE CODE § 1017. The privilege is lost though if the
defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, or otherwise tenders the issue of his
mental state. See CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 1017, comment.
31377 U.S. 201 (1964). The court held that statements by the accused elicited by
an agent of the government without the presence of the accused's counsel were mad-
missible as evidence against him. Id. at 206-07.
3863 Cal. 2d 400, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33 (1965).
39 Spencer's conviction had been affirmed in People v. Spencer, 60 Cal. 2d 64, 31
Cal. Rptr. 782, 383 P.2d 134 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1007 (1964) even though
he had dropped his insanity plea before trial.
40 In re Spencer, 63 Cal. 2d 400, 410, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753, 760, 406 P.2d 33, 40
(1965).
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lion of counsel would hinder the establishment of the rapport that is so necessary
m a psychiatric exanination." 41 To preserve some effectiveness of section 1027
the court established four rules: (1) Before submission to the examination the
defendant must be represented by counsel, or intelligently and knowingly have
waived that right.42 (2) If the defendant submits, the psychiatrist may not be
called at the guilt phase, unless the defendant puts his mental state M ssue.
4 3
(3) If the defendant puts his mental state in issue at the guilt trial, the
psychiatrist may then be called on that issue, but statements of the defendant
in the course of the examination may not be used to prove their truth, but only
as the basis for the opinion of the psyclatrist.44 (4) The defendant may not
have counsel present at the examination, since if he does not put his mental
state in issue, the incriminating statements will not be used against hn on the
issue of guilt.45 If he does put his mental state mi ssue, he cannot complain, since
he voluntarily submitted, and he should not be able to "preclude expert testi-
mony on a subject that he has himself injected into the trial."46
Concluswn
The formulation by the California Supreme Court of the rules governing the
use of the psychiatrist's testimony is not only an obvious retreat from their
previous decisions, but also an attempt to save section 1027 from being a com-
plete nullity. It would be impossible to reconcile a policy of providing a psycht-
atric examination which is conducive to full disclosure by the accused thus leading
to a proper diagnosis with a policy of allowing the psychiatrist to testify against
the accused at both the guilt and sanity phases of the trial. If the policy of
Combes47 and Ditson4 8 were followed, no attorney would allow his client to
submit to the examination if he also had pleaded not guilty, and the client could
afford to hire his own psychiatrist. Since the overriding purpose of section 1027
was to provide a sound, unbiased inquiry into the sanity of the defendant, the
parasitic corollary that "voluntary" statements of the accused during the psycl-
atric examination could be used against hun was rightly cut off before it destroyed
the statute.
Spencer4 9 created a privilege for the defendant, that nothing in the ex-
amination could be used against him on the issue of guilt, at least as long as he
does not raise the issue of his mental condition at the guilt phase. However, since
insanity is raised as a defense most often in murder cases, if the defendant pleads
not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, the not guilty plea is often based
at least partly on the ground that the defendant lacked a special mental element
41 Id. at 411, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 761, 406 P.2d at 41.
42 Id. at 412, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 761, 406 P.2d at 41.
43 Ibid.
44 IbId.
45 Id. at 412-13, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 761-62, 406 P.2d at 41-42. But the court added
that defendant's counsel could be present at the examination as an observer, not as a
participant, with the pernussion of the examining psychiatrist, or the trial judge. Id. at
413, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 762, 406 P.2d at 42.
40 Id. at 413, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 761-62, 406 P.2d at 41-42.
47 People v. Combes, 56 Cal. 2d 135, 14 Cal. Rptr. 4, 363 P.2d 4 (1961).
4
8 People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714 (1962).
49 1n re Spencer, 63 Cal. 2d 400, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33 (1965).
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of the crime.50 The defendant has then raised the issue of his mental condition
during the guilt phase, and the psychiatrist can be called.51 Although the state-
ments of the defendant are then admissible to show the basis on which the
psychiatrist has formed his opimon, under the Spencer rule they may not be
used to prove the truth of the statements as in Ditson. The court held that the
defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction that the statements may not be
considered by the jury to prove their truth,52 and if it is given, the defendant
is not deprived of any of his nghts.
53
Undoubtedly the prosecutor will tailor his examination of the psychiatrist to
reveal as many possible "bases" of the psychiatnst's opinion as he can, and
thereby get incriminating statements to the jury. Since it is usually psychologically
impossible for the jury to disregard the statements as tending to prove their
truth, the defendant is in much the same position as before Spencer. Since he
must be represented by counsel before he submits to the psychiatnst, he will
probably be advised not to submit. In the case where the court probably has
the most need of the opinion of the court-appointed psychiatrist, the issue will be
thrust back into the hands of the partisan experts. Furthermore, even if the
defendant does not plan to raise the issue of his mental state at the guilt phase,
he has nothing to lose by not submitting if his attorney makes the refusal for
hun without his own active participation. He still has the privilege of finding his
own psychiatrst. The weaker the case for the defendant, the more reason he
has to shop for his own expert, but yet the more reason the jury should have the
benefit of an unbiased expert.
The apparent lack of inducement for the defendant to submit to the court-
appointed psychiatrist, and the substantial possibility that section 1027 will be
ignored in the situations where the abuses it was designed to correct are most
rampant, compels a re-examination of People v. Strong.54 Had the court then
addressed itself to the narrow question of whether a compulsory psychiatric ex-
amination would violate any constitutional right, and had a compulsory examina-
tion been found constitutional, the purpose of section 1027 would have been
realized. The problems emanating from the holding that submission is voluntary
and the obvious retreat in Spencer would have been unnecessary.
If the examination were compulsory, admissions or confessions of the accused
during the examination would apparently be constitutionally protected from dis-
5O E.g., People v. Anderson, 63 Cal. 2d 351, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763, 406 P.2d 43 (1965);
People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959); People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d
330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
"[Clourts have held that evidence of any mental condition, whether it be caused by
a mental disease of defendant or by mtoxication or by drugs is relevant
to prove that the defendant was incapable of harboring the particular mental state con-
stituting an element of the offense." People v. Anderson, supra at 365-66, 46 Cal. Rptr.
at 772-73, 406 P.2d at 52-53.
51 People v. Anderson, 63 Cal. 2d 351, 367, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763, 774, 406 P.2d 43,
54 (1965).52 Failure to give the limiting instruction was held to be reversible error M People
v. Price, 63 Cal. 2d 370, 380, 46 Cal. Rptr. 775, 781-82, 406 P.2d 55, 61-62 (1965).
53 People v. Anderson, 63 Cal. 2d 351, 367, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763, 774, 406 P.2d 43,
54 (1965).
54 114 Cal. App. 522, 300 Pac. 84 (1931).
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closure by the privilege against self-mcrimination.5 5 The secondary use of the
psychiatrist in Combes5 6 and Ditson57 to incriminate the defendant at the guilt
trial would have been rightly refused in light of the main purpose of section
1027 from its first construction, rather than after thirty-five years of confusing
construction which resulted in a court-made privilege to keep the psychiatrist
out of the guilt phase of the trial.
The only states that have squarely considered the question have held that a
compulsory submission of the accused to a mental examination upon a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity does not violate the constitutional right against
self-incrimination.58 The privilege protects only testimonial compulsion, and
"does not preclude the introduction of physical disclosures the defendant is forced
to make, or the results of tests to which he has involuntarily submitted." 59 A
psychiatric examination does not
depend on his [the defendant's] testimoial responsibility. The personal character-
istics of an accused which are commonly open and observable to all are not of
that secret nature which the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
was designed to protect.0
The formulation of the rules governing section 1027 in Spencer did much
to save the statute from dropping into obscurity. A requirement of submission61
would not only nearly eliminate lapses into the battle of experts, but would
seem fundamentally fair by harmonizing the rights of the accused with the
purpose of the law to make the best possible determination of the truth.
Vernon James Jack*
55 There seems to be no case directly holding that statements compelled in an ex-
amination by a state psychiatrist fall within the privilege against self-incrimination. In
State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 67 S.E.2d 506 (1951) which sustained the validity of a
compulsory mental examination, the court added by way of dicta that the examiners
"will not be permitted, over the protest of the accused, to reveal any confession made
by him in the course of such examination, or any declarations implicating him in the
crime charged." Id. at 313, 67 S.E.2d at 508.
56 People v. Combes, 56 Cal. 2d 135, 14 Cal. Rptr. 4, 363 P.2d 4 (1961).
57 People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714 (1962).
58 E.g., State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 67 S.E.2d 506 (1951); State v. Biggle, 76
Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349 (1956). See also Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 434 (1953).
59 People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App. 2d 199, 213, 168 P.2d 443,
451 (1946).
60 State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 312, 67 S.E.2d 506, 507 (1951).
6 MoDE.L CODE OF EVmENcE rule 205 (1942) recommends: "No person has a
privilege to refuse to submit his body to examination for the purpose of dis-
covering or recording Ins corporeal features and other identifying characteristics, or his
physical or mental condition
* Member, Second Year Class.
NOTES
